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Summary findings
Schiff combines two theories - one about how  liberalization leads to political disintegration, with an
multilateral trade liberalization affects regional  increase in the number of countries.
integration, the other about how it affects political  Combining the two arguments, Schiff hypothesizes
disintegration - to explain why the ratio of free trade  that as multilateral trade liberalization proceeds and the
areas to customs unions has increased over time.  number of regional integration arrangements increases,
Ethier (1998, 1999) argues that multilateral trade  the ratio of free trade areas to customs unions also
liberalization led to the recent wave of regional  increases.
integration arrangements.  The data, which show that ratio increasing in the
Alesina and others (1997), in discussing the number  1990s, are consistent with the hypothesis.
and size of countries, argue that multilateral trade
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This paper uses two theories-on  the impact of multilateral trade liberalization
(MTL) on regional integration, and on the impact of MTL on political disintegration-to
explain why the ratio of FTAs to CUs has increased over time, and why that ratio is
larger for North-South than for South-South  regional agreements.
According to Ethier, the new regionalism differs from the old one because MTL in
manufactures is much more complete in rich countries, many LDCs have liberalized and
are trying to join the multilateral system, FDI is much more prominent, many regional
integration agreements (RIAs) are between one or several small countries and a large one,
and liberalization in the RIA is done mainly by the small countries. He argues that MTL
in rich countries makes them more attractive to LDCs. If several LDCs liberalize, it is
unclear which one  will obtain FDI. However, an LDC forming a  RIA with a  large
country will give it preferential market access and an advantage in attracting FDI. Thus,
MTL has led to the new regional integration agreements (RIAs) which have tended to
support the multilateral system.
Alesina et al. argue that a larger country size has benefits in terms of a larger
market and has costs in terms of having to provide public goods to a more heterogeneous
population. MTL enables countries to benefit from a larger market size without the need
to  be larger politically. Thus, the equilibrium size of countries falls and the number
increases as MTL proceeds.
What do these arguments taken together imply for RIAs? That MTL will result in
more, but less politically integrated, RIAs. This is examined by comparing the evolution
of FTAs, the less integrated form of RIAs, with CUs  which require setting up joint
institutions to  determine the common external tariff (CET), the distribution of tariffrevenues, and more. Depending on the comparison, we find that the ratio of FTAs to CUs
increased from 3 to 7 times between 1950-89  and 1990-98, supporting our prediction.
The two arguments also imply that the ratio of FTAs to CUs are larger in North-
South agreements than in South-South ones. The reason is that the cost of joint public
goods among heterogeneous countries--discussed by Alesina et al.--is larger when the
degree of heterogeneity is greater. Clearly, member countries of North-South RIAs differ
more than those of South-South RIAs in terms of income, size, and production structure.
Thus, countries of the North and South that decide to form a RIA will tend to choose
FrAs rather than CUs, compared to Southern countries forming a RIA. This is supported
by the evidence. Among the main RIAs, and depending on the definition, the ratio of
FrAs  to CUs for North-South RIAs is between 11 and 25 times larger than for South-
South RIAs.
Finally, we examine a number of cases where voluntary or involuntary CUs led to
losses for some members or even to conflict between members when this might have
been avoided if the member countries had formed FTAs.GLOSSARY
ROW  - Rest of the world
DC  - Developed country
LDC  - Less developed (or developing) country
MTL  - Multilateral trade liberalization
RIA  - Regional integration arrangement (or agreement)
FTA  - Free trade area (or agreement)
CU  - Customs union
CET  - Common external tariff
CUSFTA  - Canada-US FTA
NAFTA  - North American FTA (between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico)
MERCOSUR  - Southern Common Market (between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
and Paraguay)
Group of 3 (G3) - FTA between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela
CACM  - Central American Common Market
Andean Pact  - Common Market between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela
LAIA  - Latin American Integration  Agreement
CARICOM  - Caribbean Community
ECSC  - European Coal and Steel Community
EEC  - European Economic Community
EC  - European Community
EU  - European Union
CEEC  - Central and Eastern European Countries
FSU  - Former Soviet Union
UEMOA  - West African economic and monetary union
CEMAC  - Central African economic and monetary community (ex UDEAC)
CBI  - Cross Border Initiative (Sub-Saharan Africa)
GCC  - Gulf Cooperation Council
EAC  - East African Community between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
ECOWAS  - Economic Community of West African States
COMESA  - Community of Eastern and Southern Africa
AFTA  - ASEAN FTA
SAARC  - South Asian Association for Regional CooperationMultilateral  Trade Liberalization,  Political Disintegration,
and the Choice of Free Trade Agreements  versus Customs Unions
1. Introduction
When  tariffs  are  prohibitively high  so  that  countries  are  autarkic,  regional
integration necessarily raises bloc welfare since trade diversion cannot take place. At the
other extreme, when tariffs with non-partner countries are zero, regional integration
among small economies also raises bloc welfare. However, for any tariff between zero
and autarkic values, regional integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare. Despite
this ambiguity,  the world has seen a resurgence  of regional integration agreements (RIAs)
in recent years.
Various reasons have been provided for this resurgence. One claim is that the EC
Single Market Program (EC-92) led to a fear of a 'Fortress Europe' from which other
countries would be excluded. Second, and possibly due to the former and/or to a decline
in U.S. economic dominance, the U.S. formed first the CUSFTA with Canada and then
the NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. The events on both sides of the Atlantic increased
the cost of being excluded and thus increased the power of the exporting lobbies in the
excluded countries. This  led to  a  'domino'  effect  (Baldwin, 1995) where  excluded
countries decided either to join existing blocs or form new ones.
The resurgence of regional agreements  has also led to a fast-growing literature on
regionalism and multilateralism.  An excellent review of this literature is Winters (1996).
Most  studies  assume  that  regionalism is  exogenous  and  examine  its  impact  on
multilateralism. Ethier (1998, 1999) argues that the effect goes from multilateral trade
liberalization (MTL) to regional integration rather than the opposite. In a different vein,
Alesina et al. (1997) argue that MTL creates incentives for political disintegration. Arethe two types of arguments by Ethier and by Alesina et al. consistent with each other, i.e.,
do we observe both regional integration and political disintegration  as MTL takes place?
And what are the implications of these two types of arguments for the evolution of the
various types  of RIAs? And for  their geographic distribution? These  questions are
examined  below.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes  the theories of Alesina et al.
(1997) and Ethier (1998, 1999) in more detail. Section 3 examines the relevance of these
theories. Based on these theories, Section 4 derives two propositions on the evolution of
various  RIAs  and  on  their  geographic  distribution.  Section  5  provides  evidence
supporting the two propositions. It also examines cases where customs union formation
among unequal members led to losses and/or conflict. Section 6 concludes.
2. Multilateral  Trade Liberalization and Political and Economic Integration.
2.1 Multilateralism and political disintegration
Alesina et al. (1997) argue that economic integration should result in political
disintegration, i.e., that MTL should result in an increase in the number of countries.
They develop a  simple model where the number and size of  countries are derived
endogenously as a  function of the trade regime. Their argument goes essentially as
follows. Countries entail both costs and benefits. Costs are related to the diversity of the
population. The greater the diversity, the harder it is to manage public goods (laws,
public policies, etc.). Diversity rises with country size, so costs increase with country
size. The benefits are related to market size. In the model, a larger market size implies a
larger variety of intermediate inputs, and variety has a positive effect on productivity.
2Under general  trade  barriers (including geographical, technological, legal  and
political), country size and market size are positively related since trading intermediate
inpats internationally is more expensive than doing so domestically. Thus, the benefits of
market size increase with  country size in the presence of trade barriers. With MTL,
country size becomes increasingly less relevant for  market size. In  other words, the
benefits of  country size fall following MTL  and  hence equilibrium country size is
smaller. The authors conclude that in a world of free trade, even small cultural or ethnic
groups can benefit by forming homogeneous  political jurisdictions.!
Political disintegration has also been examined by Buchanan and Faith (1987) and
Bolton and Roland (1997). Buchanan and Faith (1987) show how the threat of secession
constrains government taxation policy. Bolton and Roland (1997) emphasize political
conflict over redistribution policies in a median-voter model and show how separation or
unification is determined both by the degree to which income distributions vary across
regions and by the efficiency gains from unification. Section 5.3 below examines cases
where heterogeneity across regions of a customs union results in losses, separation or
attempted separation.2
Alesina et al. (1997) also test the implications of their model by regressing growth
on  country size, openness and the interaction of the two  variables. Country size is
measured by either population or GDP, and openness is measured by exports plus imports
over GDP. The sample includes 84 developed and developing countries, and the sample
period 1960-1989 is divided into 6 five-year periods for which the growth equation is
' If trade barriers are endogenous, they would decline as country size falls because smaller countries would
have more to gain from lower barriers. Then, higher heterogeneity costs would result in smaller nations and
in lower trade barriers; and an exogenous reduction in trade barriers would reduce country size and would
thus also reduce trade barriers indirectly.
2 For a brief survey of theories of break-up and integration of nations, see Bolton et al. (1996).
3formulated, with coefficients constrained to equality across time periods. A number of
alternative  estimation  methods  are  used  (SUR,  3SLS,  panel  data-random  effects
estimation). The authors find a highly significant and positive growth impact of openness
and country size, and a negative impact for their interaction. The results are robust to the
various estimation methods and definitions of size, and to the use of a series of control
(structural) variables.  The negative coefficient for  interaction of  size and  openness
implies that as openness increases, the impact of country size on growth declines. In other
words, the benefits of size decline with openness, as predicted by the theory.
The authors argue that the historical record supports their model. For instance,
unification of Italy (1861) and Germany (1871) can be  viewed as  attempts to build
economies of reasonable size in a world of trade barriers, while minimizing heterogeneity
costs through relative cultural and  ethnic homogeneity. From  1875 to  the Treaty  of
Versailles in  1919-a  period of growing trade restrictions-few  new countries were
created while some disappeared. A similar pattern holds for the interwar period which
coincided with a collapse of international trade and a major rise in protectionism, largely
as a response to the Great Depression.
Due to MTL, decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet bloc (another form of
decolonization), the  post-Second World  War period  witnessed  an  explosion in  the
number of independent countries, from 89 in 1950 to 192 in  1995. Decolonization may
also have been  affected by MTL in  the  sense that it might have been  slower in  a
protectionist world where large nations would have remained more dependent on their
colonies for raw materials and as markets for their output. As for countries of the former
Soviet Union (FSU), they were able to substantially redirect their trade towards the West,
something  which would have been much harder in a world of high trade barriers.
4In the case of the EU, the authors disagree with the common view that there has
been increased political integration. On the contrary, they view the true political change
as being the increased separatism in several member countries. This would include the
Basque and Catalan regions in Spain, the Flemish and Walloon regions in Belgium, the
Northern region of Italy, Brittany and Corsica in  France, and Scotland and Northern
Ireland in the U.K., where cultural, linguistic and ethnic minorities feel increasingly
viable economically  in an integrated Europe.
Thus, the authors argue that their model, empirical estimation, and the historical
record all support the view that MTL leads to political disintegration, with an increase in
the number (and decrease in the size) of countries.
2.2 Multilateralism  and regionalism
Ethier (1998, 1999), on the other hand, examines the relationship between MTL
and regional integration. He claims that trade theorists have so far examined regional
integration from the old Vinerian perspective, have assumed that it is exogenous, and
have obtained mixed answers about its impact on welfare and on MTL.  He argues that
recent episodes of regional integration are in fact caused by MTL, are beneficial, and help
promote further MTL. His argument is as follows.
First, the international environment differs in three important ways from the one
during the old regionalism: (i) MTL in manufactured goods among developed countries
(DCs) is much more complete; (ii) many developing countries (LDCs) have abandoned
the anti-trade, anti-market policies and are now actively trying to join the multilateral
system; and  (iii)  FDI  is  much  more prominent.  Second,  the  new  regionalism is
characterized  by (a) one or more small countries linking up with a large one; (b) the small
5countries having made significant unilateral reforms; (c) the degree of liberalization in
the RIAs being modest and being primarily done by the small countries; (d) a broadening
of the range of instruments over which negotiation is feasible; and (e) participants being
mostly neighbors (as was also true in the old regionalism).
Ethier argues that these stylized facts offer a good representation of recent RIAs,
including the Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA), NAFrA, the access of Austria, Finland and
Sweden to the EU, the Europe Agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs), and MERCOSUR.  One could probably add to this list the
FTAs between the EU and a number of Mediterranean countries, the EU-Turkey CU
(customs union), the EU-South Africa  FTA and the very recent EU-Mexico FTA.
Ethier's argument that MTL causes regional integration goes as follows. LDCs start
in autarky. Production of some DC products takes place in a two-step process, and the
first step can be carried out away from where consumption takes place, i.e., in LDCs. As
the  DCs  move  from  a  non-cooperative (Nash) tariff  equilibrium to  a  cooperative
(multilateral) one, DC tariff rates fall. The greater degree of MTL raises the benefit for
LDCs of joining the multilateral trading system. Hence, some LDCs, where the gains
from reform are now sufficient to overcome resistance by special interests opposed to it,
decide to reform. Those who hope to succeed attract FDI from DCs who invest in order
to produce there and export back to the North. Also, by reforming, they obtain access to
superior DC technology and production methods.
The problem is that if several LDCs reform simultaneously, none can be sure to
obtain any  FDI.  Regional integration with  a  large  country provides an  LDC  with
preferential and more secure access to that country's market (as well as with credibility
by locking in its reforms in the RIA). This ensures that the developed partner country will
6invest in its partner developing country rather than in other ones. Thus, the successfully
reforming  LDCs enter a RIA with some DC, possibly with more than one LDC joining a
DC. Though the DCs have little to gain, they are willing to enter the RIA since they have
nothing to  lose  either,  and  side-payments from  LDCs are  possible. Thus, regional
integration results in FDI flows and ensures that the reform succeeds. By helping to
remove the uncertainty about obtaining FDI, regional integration helps consolidate the
reform. This clearly differs from the usual regional integration story which focuses on
trade rather than on FDI.
Ethier  concludes that  regional  integration is  the  consequence  of  multilateral
success, and it in turn strengthens-rather  than undermines-the  basis for a commitment
to the multilateral order. He also argues that though small countries are LDCs in his
model, the results apply to other small countries as well. Finally, his model is especially
designed to explain the explosion of RIAs in the 1990s.
3. Relevance of these Theories
In their description of the historical record, Alesina et al. (1997) argue that EU
countries  are  not  'unifying'  politically.  Rather,  the  EU  at  most  "...  will  be  a  loose
federation  of independent  states  joined in a common currency area ... in addition to a free
trade area supplemented by a harmonization of regulations and standards." (p. 24). I
would argue that EU integration is much deeper than described by Alesina et al. First,
with respect to trade, from the start it entailed more than a free trade area since it required
establishing supra-national bodies in order to  negotiate a common external tariff and
revenue sharing among member countries. Second, it involves the free movement of
labor and capital as well as that of goods and services. Third, it entails the creation of a
7number  of  supra-national institutions.  These  include  a  legislature-the  European
Parliament,  an  executive-the  European  Commission, a  cabinet-the  Council  of
Ministers, a judiciary-the  European  Court of Justice whose decisions supersede national
ones, a European Central Bank responsible for EU-wide monetary policy, a European
Investment Bank, an Economic and Social Committee, a Committee of the Regions, an
Environment Agency, a Court of Auditors, and more. Thus, though EU integration may
not result in a supra-national  state in the classical sense of a 'nation state', it goes well
beyond money and trade and involves a number of nation-like  institutions.
Rather than assume that public goods are provided either at the union level, at the
country  level  or  at  the  sub-country regional  level  but  not  at  the  various  levels
simultaneously, it seems more realistic to assume that these public goods can coexist at
the various levels. Also, it seems more fruitful to think not simply in terms of change in
the number of countries, but rather in terms of a continuum with, say, regions within a
country moving from more to less integrated units (and possibly, though not necessarily,
becoming new countries), and countries within a RIA becoming more, or less, politically
integrated. Then, in the case of the EU, one might have member countries becoming
gradually more integrated, while some regions within member countries might become
relatively more independent, and with the two trends occurring simultaneously.
Ethier's  theory applies to RIAs between a large country or region (US, EU or
Brazil) and smaller ones, though-as  noted by Winters (1999) -not  to RIAs between
countries of similar size such as UEMOA or CEMAC in Sub-Saharan Africa, the revived
CACM or Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela) in Latin America, or AFTA
(the ASEAN FTA) in Asia. Also, the case of MERCOSUR is unclear because, though
Brazil is much larger than other member countries, it is not necessarily more liberal
8(Winters, 1999). Thus, Ethier's explanation of the recent resurgence of RIAs applies to
some  types  of  RIAs-essentially  North-South  and  East-West  ones-though  not
necessarily to others. This issue is examined in Section 5 dealing with evidence.
4. Implications for RIAs
Are the findings from Alesina et al. that MTL leads to  political disintegration
consistent with  Ethier's  findings that MTL leads to regional integration? If  the two
propositions are consistent, they can be so in several ways, three of which are examined
below. For  instance, do  we observe regional integration and  political  disintegration
occurring simultaneously  in the sense that as RIAs are formed, member countries split up
into smaller countries? The answer is clearly no, though cases of political disintegration
associated with trade policy are examined in Section 5.3, part 4. In fact, as discussed in
Section 2.1, evidence from the 19'h  century-though  not for the 20'h century--indicates
that some episodes of regional integration led to political integration. 3
A second implication of the two propositions is that as MTL progresses, countries
want increasingly to pursue regional integration, but in a way that limits or reduces the
degree of political integration. In other words, as MTL proceeds over time, one would
expect a change in the composition of RIAs from more to less politically integrated ones.
This implication is discussed below by distinguishing between customs unions (CUs) and
FTAs and is examined empirically  in the next section.
Customs  unions  typically  entail  more  political  integration  among  member
countries than FTAs. First, CUs entail supra-national bodies to  negotiate the common
3 Political integration took place in the late 20'  century in the case of East and West Germany, though this
was unrelated to regional integration but rather was a case of reunification of a divided country.
9external tariff (CET) and revenue-sharing mechanisms, which is not the case for FTAs.
Second, CUs are often pursued by countries in order to attain some political objectives,
including the creation of regional public goods such as security or democracy. This was
the case for the EU and MERCOSUR (Schiff and Winters, 1998; World Bank, 2000).
For instance, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet-the  founding fathers of the EEC-were
explicit that the precursor of the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
was to make Franco-German  war not only "unthinkable,  but materially  impossible." In fact,
the preamble to the 1951 Paris treaty establishing the ECSC "resolved to substitute for
age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; [and] to create, by establishing
an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples
long divided by bloody conflicts." Later echoes of this view are expressed by Dr. Walter
Hallstein, a former president of the EC Commission,  who stated: "We are not in business at
all; we are in politics" (Schiff and Winters, 1998; World  Bank, 2000).
As for MERCOSUR,  international  security and strengthening  democracy  also seems
to have played an important role. Argentina and Brazil signed nuclear cooperation and
economic agreements in the mid-1980s with the expectation that this would help reduce
tensions between them by curtailing the power of the military and help strengthen their
fragile democracies. The creation of MERCOSUR in  1991 reinforced this process and
bound smaller neighbors into it.5 And being a democracy  has become an explicit condition
of membership  in MERCOSUR  or association  with it (as in the case of Chile and Bolivia).
4 Schiff and Winters (1998) show that a RIA can be an Pareto optimum arrangement if it helps internalize
some externality, including security or governance,  with optimum external barriers falling over time and
following deep integration measures.
5 Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General  of UNCTAD and formerly a foreign minister in the Brazilian
government,  confirms the importance of MERCOSUR's security aspects: "Both countries were emerging
from a period of military governments, during which considerable  tension had characterized the bilateral
relationship,  centered on a long-standing controversy about competing hydroelectric projects in
international  rivers of the Plata Basin. Both militaries had also continued to pursue their secret nuclear
10Some CUs have evolved  into something  deeper over time, such as a common  market
(with free movement of  factors), the harmonization of regulations and  standards, and
possibly  with a host of supra-national  institutions  as in the EU. And going back to the 19"
century, some CUs evolved into nation-states  over time, such as the unification  of Italy in
1861, the German Zollverein  evolving into the German state in 1871, and Wallachia  and
Moidavia  becoming  Romania  in 1881.
In conclusion,  CUs entail the creation of public goods, whether it is common trade
Dolicy,  security,  governance,  or some other aspects  of deep integration,  while this is not the
case with FTAs (or at least much less so since members of FIAs must agree on exceptions
and rules of origin). Thus, CUs require a greater degree of compromise  than FTAs and are
thus more costly.
Two main findings of this paper are that i) the willingness  to pay the higher cost of
CUs relative to the cost of forming  a FTA falls with MTL, and the ratio of FTAs to CUs is
thus likely to increase  with MTL; and ii) the cost of forming  a CU relative to that of forming
a FTA is lower when member countries  are less diverse,  and CUs are thus likely to be more
frequent  relative  to FrAs in South-South  than in North-South  RIAs.
5. Evidence
Customs unions entail a variety of measures of political integration which are not
part of FrAs. THence,  one implication  from the propositions  advanced  by Alesina et al. and
by Ethier is that as MTL increased, so would the ratio of FTAs to CUs (and so would the
programs. It was essential to start with agreements  in the economic areas in order to create a more positive
external environment  that rendered it possible to contain the military nuclear programs, and to replace
rivalry by integration.  This effort was developed along successive stages and eventually led to signature  by
the two governments  of Brazil and Argentina." (Ricupero, 1998,  personal comnmunication;  and World
Bank, 2000, p. 10).
11total number  of RIAs). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the number of new CUs and FlAs
over five decades,  from 1949-59  to 1990-98.  Data are from the WTO. Column 4 shows the
total number of RIAs or the sum of Columns 2 and 3, and Column 5 gives the ratio of FTAs
to CUs or the ratio of Columns 3 to 2.
Three alternative series of numbers are presented for the 1990s. The first row (a)
includes all countries; the second row (b) excludes South-South  RIAs (as well as East-East
RIAs between countries  from the CEEC or the FSU); and the third row (c) excludes South-
South (and East-East) RIAs as well as any East-West RIA involving countries from the
CEEC  or the FSU. The reason for including  Row (b) is that Ethier's model does not explain
the formation of  South-South (and East-East) RIAs (except possibly for MERCOSUR
where Brazil is much larger than the other member countries); and the reason for including
Row (c) is that East-West RIAs involving CEEC and FSU countries would not  have
occurred without the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Ethier's model does not explain this
collapse. On the other hand, Alesina et al. suggest that MTL made the collapse of the FSU
easier as openness allowed them and the CEEC to have improved access to the EU.  And
Ethier argues that his model also fits the Europe Agreements between the EU and the
CEECs. Thus, the RIAs included in either Rows (b) or (c) are closer to the concept of new
regionalism  that Ethier (1998, 1999)  had in mind than is the case for Row (a).
Looking at Column  3, the total number  of RIAs increased from an average of 6.5 per
decade in 1949-89  to 84 in 1990-99  (Row  a), or some 13 times. Excluding South-South  (and
East-East) RIAs (Row b), the total number of RIAs in the 1990s falls by 50%, from 84 to
42, or over six times the average in previous decades. Excluding also East-West RIAs with
CEEC and FSU countries (Row c), the total number of RIAs in the 1990s  falls another 50%
to 21, which is over 3 times the average in previous decades. This large increase in RIAs in
12the  1990s is  compatible with  Ethier's  argument of  being the  outcome of  increased
multilateral liberalization and globalization since the index of  global openness (world
exports over GDP, shown in Column 1, Table 1) increased  by over 20% between 1989 and
1998.  However,  it is also compatible  with alternative  hypotheses, such as the domino effect
triggered by a fear of Fortress Europe (EC-92) and/or by the U.S. moving away from
multilateralism  and signing CUSFTA  and NAFTA.
We now examine two main points, on the evolution of FTAs versus CUs (Section
5.1) and on their geographic  distribution  (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 shows cases where CUs
resulted  in costs for some members  and/or  conflicts  between  them.
5.1. Evolution  of FTAs and CUs over time
Our hypothesis,  based on Alesina et al., is that the ratio of FTAs to CUs increases
over time as MTL increases.  The ratio of FTAs to CUs is given in Column 5. It rises from
1949-59 to 1970-79, falls in 1980-89 and then experiences  a huge increase in the 1990s.
Note that the direction  of change of the ratio of FTAs to CUs follows that of MTL: both
increase  from the 1950s  to the 1970s,  fall in the 1980s,  and increase in the 1990s  (Columns
1 and 5, Table 1).
The ratio averaged 1.31 in the first four decades, and jumped to 9.50 in the 1990s
when all countries are included (Row a), to 6.00 when South-South  (and East-East) RIAs
are excluded (Row b), and to 4.25 when any East-West RIA involving CEEC or FSU
countries  are also excluded  (Row c). In other words, the ratio of FTAs to CUs in the 1990s
is some 3 to 7 times larger than the average  in previous decades.
According  to Ethier, the increase in RIAs is caused by MTL. The large increase in
RIAs occurred in the 1990s  when MTL increased by 20%. However, the large increase in
13MTL occurred  in the 1970s  (see Column 1, Table 1) and is not accompanied  by an increase
in the number of RIAs until the 1990s.  This remains somewhat  of a puzzle. One possibility
is that regionalism  does not respond to current increases  in MTL but to the accumulation  of
past multilateral liberalization episodes. In fact, in describing how the new international
environment  differs from the old one, Ethier states  that MTL in manufacturing  goods among
DCs is "much more complete." In other words, what seems to matter for the increase in
RIAs is the current level of MTL rather than changes in MTL; or, relatedly,  MTL may need
to reach a threshold  before  countries  find it worthwhile  to form RIAs.
Though we have 50 annual observations (1949-98),  no econometric analysis was
undertaken. The reason is that annual data on the number of new RIAs are not very
informative  and exploring  the relationship  between new RIAs and MTL on an annual basis
does not seem to make much sense. According to Ethier, regional integration follows
multilateral  liberalization.  However,  his model is essentially  static and does not provide  any
indication  of the time lag between  MTL and regional integration  or its determinants.
5.2. Geographic  Distribution  of FTAs and CUs
We have argued that we expect the ratio of FTAs to CUs to be larger in North-South
RIAs compared to South-South  ones because  of the greater country heterogeneity  in North-
South RIAs. The main RIAs, organized by CUs or FTAs and by North-South or South-
South RIAs, are listed below.
North-South:
FTAs: NAFIA;  EU-Tunisia; EU-Morocco; EU  and  CEECs  (Hungary, Poland,
Bulgaria,  Romania,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Czech Republic;  Slovak Republic;  Slovenia);
EU-South  Africa; EU-Mexico.
14CUs:  EU-Turkey.
South-South:
FTAs:  Group of 3; LAIA; CBI; AFrA; GCC; SAARC.
CUs: Andean Pact; CACM; MERCOSUR; CARICOM; EAC; CEMAC; UEMOA;
ECOWAS;  COMESA.
Based on the RIAs listed above, we find a ratio of FrAs  to CUs of 15 for North-
South RIAs and of 0.66 for South-South  RIAs. SACU was not included because it is not
clear whether it should be defined as a North-South or South-South RIA. If SACU is
defined as a North-South  CU, then the ratio of FTAs to CUs for North-South  RIAs falls to
7.5. If SACU is defined as a South-South  RIA, then the ratio of FrAs  to CUs for South-
South RIAs falls to 0.6. Thus, the ratio of FTAs to CUs is between 11.25 (=7.5/.66)  and 25
(=15/.6) times larger in North-South  RIAs than in South-South  RIAs.  This confirms our
prediction.
5.3. CUs and the Effects  of HeterogeneitY
The superiority of a FTA over a CU in the case of a high degree of heterogeneity
between  member countries is particularly  relevant  for a small and weak country (or region)
in a RIA with a large country  (or region).  This point  is illustrated  with four sets of cases: 1) a
voluntary  CU and economic  losses; 2) a voluntary  CU and conflict  between members; 3) an
involuntary  CU and economic  losses; and 4) an involuntary  CU and attempts  to secede.
1. A small member in a voluntary  CU with a large partner(s)  may experience  a loss
when compared with being in a FTA. As discussed in Section 4, Argentina and Brazil
wished to form a Common Market in part to reduce tensions between them and resolve
15security problems, and to strengthen  their fragile democracies.  Once Argentina and Brazil
decided to form a Common Market, Uruguay-which  sold 35 percent of its exports to its
neighbors Argentina and Brazil in  1990-realized  it had little choice but to join. With
Paraguay  reaching  the same conclusion,  MERCOSUR  was formed.  However, the degree of
heterogeneity  between the member countries is large. For instance, given that Brazil is a
more industrialized  country and manufactures  machinery  and equipment  behind a protective
tariff, and given that Brazil was dominant in the determination  of MERCOSUR's CET
(Olarreaga  and Soloaga, 1998), the small member countries were forced to raise tariffs on
these important  capital goods. This had a negative  impact on their terms of trade and their
competitiveness.  This cost would have been avoided  if they had formed a FTA rather than a
CU with the other MERCOSUR  members.  This is what Chile decided to do because it felt
that its  trade policy and interests differed markedly from those of  the  members of
MERCOSUR.6
2. Voluntary CUs among heterogeneous members may result in  conflict if  some
members consider that the distribution of benefits and/or losses is unfair. Examples are
drawn from World Bank (2000). For instance, the East African Community (EAC) was
formed in  1967 between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. However, because Kenya had a
more developed  manufacturing  sector than the other members,  the common external tariff
(CET) which protected manufacturing  benefited Kenya at the expense of the others, both
because  Kenyan  producers  gained at the expense  of Tanzanian  and Ugandan  consumers,  and
because of industry clustering in Kenya and moving away from Tanzania and Uganda.
Disagreement  about compensation  for income losses by Tanzania and Uganda led to the
collapse  of the EAC, the closing  of borders  and the confiscation  of EAC assets in 1978,  and
6 It is not certain  that Argentina  and Brazil would have accepted to form  a FTA with Uruguay  or Paraguay
16contributed  to the conflict between Tanzania and Uganda in 1979. Another example is the
Central American Common Market (CACM) where Honduran dissatisfaction with the
distribution of benefits was an element behind the 1969 military conflict with (the more
developed) El Salvador. After the war, El Salvador vetoed a proposed development fund
designed  to channel additional  resources to Honduras.  This prompted Honduras  to leave the
CACM.
3. A small country may enter a CU involuntarily  due to the political and economic
pressures exerted by a large neighbor. For instance, following the demise of the FSU, the
CIS (Commonwealth  of Independent States)  was established  between Russia and ten of the
former republics.  Most former republics  are small, poor and land-locked,  and they had little
choice but to join Russia in the CIS. The Baltic countries, which decided to reorient their
trade toward Europe and the rest of the world, did not join the CIS and signed Association
Agreements  with the EU. Georgia  also declined  to join at first. Interestingly,  the rebel forces
which had been very successful and even reached the capital, somehow disappeared after
Georgia agreed to join the CIS. Belarus, Kazakhstan  and Russia established a CU in 1995.
Though the Kyrgyz Republic joined in 1996, it never actually  implemented the CET (equal
to Russia's tariff schedule).  Kazakhstan  did implement  the CU for some 8 to 10 months but,
realizing how costly it was, it then stopped. Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997) advised the
republics which had not yet joined the CU to maintain an open trade regime and accede to
the WTO, the main reason being that the potential dynamic gains from access to new
technologies  would be much higher by opening to the world rather than opening to Russia
and a few other republics. The other reason is that acceding  to the WTO was seen as a way
to deflect  pressure from Russia to join the CU. The Kyrgyz Republic did accede  to the WTO
in 1990  and it was not discussed at the time.
17and bound its tariffs for a number of products below the level of Russia's tariffs, to the
displeasure  of the latter. Several  other  republics  are close to acceding  to the WTO.
4. The final case is one of an involuntary CU resulting in conflict. The typical
case is that of a less-developed region within a given country which is subjected to a
costly trade policy determrined  by the dominant region, and therefore decides to secede.
Example are drawn from World Bank (2000). The first one is the American Civil War.
The Northern states produced manufactures which they sold to the Southern states, and
the Southern states produced cotton which they exported to Europe. Tariffs first nearly
triggered civil war in 1828. The United States was already a customs union, but in that
year Congress, dominated by Northern interests, sharply raised the US import duty on
manufactures.  This increased the price that Northern manufacturers could charge in the
South, and so generated a massive income transfer from the South to the North.  The
policy was referred to  in the South as the  'Tariff of Abominations'. South Carolina
refused to  collect it  and threatened to  secede unless it  was rescinded. The Federal
government sent in troops but Congress backed down before fighting developed. In 1860
Northem interests tried again, because the North had so much to gain from high tariffs.
This time Congress would not back down. This (perhaps as much as slavery) was the
issue that led the Southern states to try to quit the Union. A second example is the war
between East and  West  Pakistan (World Bank,  2000).  West  Pakistan was  selling
manufactures  to East Pakistan at prices forced well above world levels by tariff barriers.
When Pakistan was created in  1947, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 17
percent higher than in the East, but the differential grew steadily-to  32 percent in
1959/60, 45 percent in 1964/65 and 61 percent by 1969/70. East Pakistan's desire for
18secession-which  resulted in Bangladesh-was  in part motivated by resentment at the
large income transfers the tariff barriers had created and the growing income differential.
Note that the conflicts between  the member  countries of the EAC and the CACM and
between the regions of the U.S. and Pakistan, as well as the economic losses in other CUs
with a high degree of heterogeneity,  might have been avoided if they had formed FTAs. Of
course, FTAs are not sufficient to  prevent trade diversion, lower  terms of  trade and
economic loss by member countries, but they enable them to freely determine their own
trade policy in order to minimize these losses and satisfy their own interests. For instance,
unilateral trade liberalization  is one way for members of FTAs to minimize trade diversion
and economic losses. Thus, FTAs provide a useful alternative  to the potential tensions and
military conflicts which CUs may generate  among heterogeneous  RIA members.  Note also
that within CUs, tensions would have been lower if the CET had been lower because the
latter would have resulted in smaller transfers among member countries. For instance, the
CACM and the EAC were recently revived and both now have a lower CET. Hence, the
conflicts  caused  by the unequal  distrinution  of gains and losses among  member countries  are
less likely to occur in the more recent incarnations  of these CUs.
6. Conclusion
This paper uses two models in order to derive implications about the evolution of
various RIAs over time and about their geographic  distribution.  Ethier (1998, 1999)  argues
that MTL led to the recent wave of RIAs. On the other hand, Alesina et al  (1997) argues
that MTL leads to political disintegration. Combining the two arguments, it was first
hypothesized  that as MTL proceeded and the number of RIAs increased, the ratio of FTAs
19to CUs would increase as well, and second, that this ratio would be larger for North-South
than for South-South  RIAs. The data show an increase  in that ratio in the 1990s  and a higher
ratio for North-South than for South-South RIAs, and  are thus consistent with both
hypotheses. Finally, a  number of CUs are examined where heterogeneity resulted in
economic  losses for some of the members  and at times resulted  in conflict.
20Table 1. Regional Agreements
Period  Openness  Number of  Ratio
X/GDP in %  CUs  FTAs  RIAs  FTAs/CUs
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
1949-59  9.03  2  2  4  1.00
1960-69  9.73  S  7  12  1.40
1970-79  16.7  2  3  5  1.50
1980-89  lS.S  3  4  7  1.33
1990-98:
a l/  18.8  8  76  84  9.50
B  6  36  42  6.00
C~~  ~  4 1/  C  4  17  21  4.25
a:  All countries
b: Excludes South-South  RIAs (including  East-East ones)
c: Excludes  South-South  RIAs and RIAs involving  CEEC and FSU countries.
Note: -Data are from the WTO. Specific information  on the RIAs is available from the author.
- Openness  is defined as exports/GDP  (x 100) and is reported for the last year of each decade
except in the 1990s  when it is reported for 1998.
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